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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950152-CA 
JURISDICTION TEMF .ATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
After defendant pled '-•• •• > Regret i'elony, 
and one count of criminal mischief, a third-degree felony (R. 20), Judge John A. 
Rokich sentenced him to two concurrent prison sentences: one to fifteen years for 
the second-degree felony and zero to five years for the third-degree felony, plus 
restitution in the amount of $8,108 (R. 35). Defendant's appeal of his sentence is 
properly in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES ON AIM'FAI AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant's failure lo an.'iir In the ln.il roun that it; was 
required to impose the guidelines sentence precludes his raising the issu the 
first time on appeal. Because the trial court did not examine this issue, there is 
no standard of review applicable. 
2. Did the trial court violate equal protection or the uniform application 
of laws requirement by sentencing defendant to prison and defendant's partner-in-
crime, Jason John Black, to probation. An appellate court will modify a district 
court's discretionary choice in sentencing only if "no reasonable person would 
take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121 
(Utah App. 1995). 
3. Whether defendant's failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea in the trial court within 30 days deprives this Court of jurisdiction to 
determine whether the plea was knowing and voluntary or taken in strict 
compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? This issue is a 
question of law that this Court should review for correctness. State v. James. 
819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); see also. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
4. Did defendant's failure to file with the trial court an affidavit under 
rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the judge was biased, bar 
him from raising the issue on appeal? Because the trial court did not examine 
this isssue, there is no standard of review applicable. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Relevant provisions are included in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural history 
()n November *, J'-J'M, delcndanl pled umllv to on< count of theft a 
v- ond-degree felony, and one count of criminal mischi* • - third-degree felony 
(R. 20). On January 19, 1995, the trial court sentenced defendant to two 
concurrent prison sentences: one to fifteen years for the second-degree felony and 
zero to five years for the third-degree felony, plus restitution in the amount of 
$8,108 (R. 35). On January 27, 1995, more than sixty days after pleading guilty, 
defendant moved to withdraw his plea (R. 59). By an unsigned minute entry 
dated January M\, I 'W i ih u lal i omi deme :?'•• . ... 
K'hruar I "\ It1'11'' defendant tilnl a notiiv - .-.-• -:..s 
never issued a signed order denying the motion to withdraw fid.) 
Shortly after defendant filed his docketing statement, the State filed a 
motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the trial court had not yet issued 
a final order regarding the motion to withdraw fid.). This Court granted that 
motion in part, dismissing the appeal as it relates to defendant's motion to 
withdraw his jnnliv plea (iii.i Despili: tins < 'omi \ ordci, defendant's brief dealt 
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extensively with the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The State filed a motion 
to strike these portions on August 28, 1995 and on September 20, 1995, the 
Court granted the motion. On November 30, 1995, after defendant had filed an 
untimely response to the motion and the order, this Court vacated its September 
20 order, striking only point VII of the defendant's brief. 
Statement of facts 
This statement is taken from defendant's pre-sentence report, a copy of 
which is attached to his brief. 
Defendant and a group of other people stole a 1994 Ford F150 pickup 
truck and a 1994 Ford Probe from Timothy Ford/Chrysler Auto Dealership in 
Tooele, Utah (Pre-sentence investigation, at 2; attached to defendant's brief). 
They drove the truck up to Middle Canyon, vandalized it, and then drove the 
Probe to Little Mountain in Grantsville, stripping it of its speakers, spare tire, 
and jack fid."). The group "started to drive the Probe around the gravel pit, 
jumping it off small hills, running it into hills and spinning circles. After awhile 
all four began to break the windows and beat on the car. The last thing they did 
was to put a rock on the accelerator and run it into a ditch" (id.). The vandalism 
to both vehicles caused $23,000 in damage (id.). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because of defendant's failure to raise issues before the trial court and to 
file his motion to withdraw his pleas within the 30-day period, he is now 
precluded from seeking review in this Court. Defendant never argued to the trial 
court that it had to sentence him to probation because of AP&P's calculation of 
. guidelines. Rath-. . •.-.. 
recommendation linplieill, recouniziny lliiil il I'ould IVIIIM' in ilu so Mso e\in 
though the trial court told defendant that he only had 30 days in which to 
withdraw his pleas, defendant did not file for more than two months. 
Defendant's also failed to properly bring to the trial court's attention his 
allegation of bias through an affidavit under rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This rule provides a mechanism for bringing allegations of bias and 
prejudice against a judge and musl he used he I ore appeal. These procedural 
delects preu'iil Ilu, Cnurl I nun re\ir\nii" F VI. 
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to decide the merits of defendant's 
arguments, it would find that they are insubstantial. They either ignore or 
misconstrue the governing case law or misstate the evidence in the record. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court violated equal protection because it 
did not give him the same sentence it did to his co-defendant, Jason John Black, 
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is similarly misplaced. The equal protection does not require that individuals 
with different characteristics and backgrounds be given the same sentence, even 
if they were convicted of the same crime. Defendant had a much lengthier 
juvenile criminal history, showed less cooperation with the police and, in 
general, appeared a less promising candidate for probation than did Black. Based 
on these disparate circumstances, defendant cannot say that "no unreasonable 
person" would have adopted the trial court's view, i.e., that defendant should be 
sent to prison. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE THE 
TRIAL COURT THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
ADDRESS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES REQUIRED THE 
COURT TO IMPOSE PROBATION, THIS COURT 
SHOULD NOT REVIEW THE ARGUMENT ON 
APPEAL. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the Utah Sentencing and Release 
Guidelines required the trial court to give defendant probation. Brief of 
defendant at 4-5. Although defendant asked the trial court to follow Adult 
Probation & Parole's recommendation for probation, he did not argue to the 
court, as he does now, that it legally had no other choice. Defendant's present 
attempt to assert this claim for the first time on appeal violates the "longstanding 
6 
rule" that appellants must first give the trial court the opportunity to address an 
objection. State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1994); State v. Bywater. 
748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987) (applying to sentencing issues the "longstanding 
rule" that issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived). Although "plain 
error" may allow an appellant to survive a failure to raise an issue before the trial 
court, defendant has not even argued plain error. Finally, the fact that defendant 
requested the trial court to impose the guidelines sentence probably led the court 
to believe that it was free to disregard the guidelines. Thus, any attempt to argue 
plain error would be defeated by the fact that defendant himself invited the 
court's ruling and may not now attack it on appeal. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).1 
1
 Despite defendant's inability to raise this claim on appeal due to his failure to 
raise the issue in the trial court, the idea that trial courts are bound by the sentencing 
guidelines is simply wrong. In Preece v. House. 886 P.2d 508, 510 (Utah 1994), the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that the Board of Pardons and Parole was not required to use the 
guidelines in fixing a parole release date and that the guidelines did not have the "force and 
effect of law." This conclusion logically governs defendant's analogous claim that the 
guidelines prohibit courts from using their independent reasoning in setting a sentence. 
The actual standard of review here is not whether the sentence exceeded the guidelines 
but whether "no reasonable person" could adopt the trial court's view that a prison sentence, 
rather than probation, was appropriate. State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah App. 
1995). Given defendant's 38 prior adjudications of guilt while a juvenile, his refusal to 
cooperate with AP&P in the pre-sentence investigation process, and the extent of damage 
committed in this offense, the trial court's decision to incarcerate defendant seems eminently 
reasonable. 
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H. THE DIFFERENT SENTENCES THE TRIAL 
COURT GAVE DEFENDANT AND JASON BLACK 
WERE WARRANTED BY THE DIFFERENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN EACH CASE.2 
Defendant claims he should have received probation because Jason Black, 
his co-perpetrator, did. This argument is based on a fundamental 
mischaracterization of the law, the evidence, and the record. Co-defendants are 
not entitled to the same sentence even if they are convicted of the same crimes. 
State v. Warnell. 864 P.2d 175, 178-79 (Idaho App. 1993). To the extent 
possible and reasonable, sentencing is an attempt at individualized justice. Utah's 
sentencing system is unlike the federal government's, where sentences are 
calculated by simple addition and subtraction.3 Here, a plethora of factors go 
into sentencing that cannot be reduced to numbers. These factors include the 
crime, the defendant's's criminal history, and social and educational background 
as well as the public safety and the impact on victims. From evaluating these 
2
 This point corresponds to defendant's point II. 
3
 In State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah App. 1995), this Court stated: 
"This discretion [to sentence] is not to be surrendered to a mathematical formula by which 
numbers of circumstances rather than weight of circumstances are determinative. The 
overriding consideration is that the sentence is just. One factor in mitigation or aggravation 
may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale." 
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verifiable bits of information, courts arrive at a perspective on the defendant and 
the amount of prison time, if any, needed to positively influence his future, exact 
punishment, and protect the safety of the public. Id. 
Perhaps the single most important evidence in determining a sentence is the 
defendant's criminal history. Throughout his brief, defendant asserts that his 
criminal history is similar to Black's. Brief of defendant at 2, 6, 7, 8, 9. This 
claim is false. A brief look at the PSIs and the transcript from the sentencing 
hearing shows that defendant, unlike Black, had an extensive criminal history. 
As the prosecutor pointed out in his recommendation to the judge, to which 
defendant did not object, defendant was adjudicated guilty of 38 offenses while a 
juvenile (R. 62 at 17). Five of these adjudications were for crimes that would 
have been felonies if committed by adults (id.y Defendant also previously served 
a six-month juvenile probation sentence (id.V 
By comparison, Black committed seven juvenile offenses and was never 
previously on probation. (Pre-sentence report of Jason John Black, attached to 
defendant's brief). Further, unlike defendant, Black cooperated with law 
enforcement and with AP&P after his conviction. The differences between the 
co-defendants is nicely shown by Detective Sutherland's comments in both PSIs. 
Detective Sutherland said of Black that he "does not believe the defendant [Black] 
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should go to prison, but he does believe the sentence should make an impression 
on the defendant to try and moderate his behavior." (Pre-sentence report on 
Jason Black, at 5; attached to defendant's brief). Regarding defendant, however, 
the detective said "[He] is responsible for quite a few vehicle thefts in the area 
over the last few months, and he does not believe the defendant will change his 
behavior because he does not care." (Pre-sentence report on defendant, at 5; 
attached to defendant's brief).4 
AP&P's evaluative summaries were similar in tone to these comments. 
The PSI described Black as "an excellent candidate for probation," while casting 
doubt on its own recommendation for probation in defendant's case, "His 
cooperation with this agency in arranging for this report is less than satisfactory 
leading Adult Probation & Parole to question whether the defendant will abide by 
the terms of probation." (Black's pre-sentence report at 9; defendant's pre-
sentence report at 12). 
Defendant's persistent and continuing criminal conduct gave sufficient 
reason for the trial court to treat him differently than Black. The constitutional 
requirement to apply the law uniformly does not require the courts to ignore 
4
 Although Detective Sutherland also said that he recommended defendant receive 
a sentence similar to Black's, the trial court had the right to believe Sutherland's comment was 
right, but that his sentence recommendation was wrong. 
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fundamental differences in background and character. Wright. 893 P.2d at 1121. 
These fundamental differences, which defendant still refuses to admit, required 
different sentences. The trial court thus fulfilled its mandate to consider each 
defendant individually to arrive at a just result and acted within its lawful 
discretion. 
m . BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW fflS GUILTY PLEA CAME MORE 
THAN 30 DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE 
PLEA, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE MERITS OF 
THE REQUEST AND THIS COURT SHOULD 
AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE 
MOTION ON THAT BASIS.5 
On November 3, 1994, defendant entered his guilty plea (R. 62 at 8-9). 
The trial court told him he had 30 days to withdraw it (id.). Thus, under State v. 
Price. 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), the 30-day time limit became 
jurisdictional and, if the defendant failed to bring his motion within 30 days, the 
trial court could not grant it. State v. Price. 837 P.2d at 583. Defendant did not 
file his motion to withdraw the guilty plea until January 27, 1995, more than two 
months after pleading guilty (R. 39). 
5
 The analysis under this point heading responds to points in, IV, and V of 
defendant's brief. Defendant's point VH also deals with the motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea, but this Court has already ordered it stricken. 
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In Price, this Court specifically held that the 30-day time limit was 
jurisdictional and could not be waived. Price. 837 P.2d at 583; Olson v. Salt 
Lake School District. 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986) (acquiescence is 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction, which can be raised for the first time on 
appeal). Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the merits of 
defendant's withdrawal motion, this Court should refuse to review the merits of 
the issues listed in defendants points III, IV, and IV and affirm the trial court's 
denial of the motion to withdraw defendant's guilty pleas.6 
6
 Even if this jurisdictional barrier did not preclude review of the merits, 
defendant's substantive claims are without either a legal or factual basis. Regarding point HI, 
i.e., whether the knowledge of his co-defendant's sentence to probation wrongfully lulled him 
into pleading guilty, the cases defendant's cite do not stand for his essential premise that his 
subjective hope of getting a good deal defeats an admitted "intellectual understanding" that the 
court could sentence him to hard time. Brief of Defendant at 9. The trial court did tell 
defendant that it could go beyond the recommendations of AP&P and the prosecutor. The 
court never led defendant to believe he would get the same sentence as his co-defendant (R. 62 
at 7). 
Regarding point IV, i.e.,the facts simply refute the allegation that the prosecutor did 
not fulfill his promise to recommend a diagnostic evaluation. During the change of plea 
hearing, prosecutor Jeppsen specifically told the court, "We're requesting a 90-day diagnostic 
evaluation" (R. 62 at 10). The defense attorney did not follow up on this request or even join 
in the motion and the trial court never ordered the evaluation. Ironically, the defense attorney 
actually asked to expedite the sentencing hearing, virtually assuring that no diagnostic 
evaluation could practically occur. Further, defendant's attorney affirmatively agreed to the 
imposition of sentence even without the evaluation (R. 62 at 16). 
Concerning point V, the trial court's plea colloquy was thorough and in compliance 
with rule 11. The trial court went through each part of rule 11, explaining to defendant the 
rights he was surrendering, the elements of the offenses to which he was pleading and the 
supporting factual elements, the potential sentences, and the time limits for withdrawing the 
appeal (R. 62 at 6-9). Finally, the trial court found and concluded that the plea was made 
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IV. BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT FILE AN 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDICIAL BIAS WITH THE 
TRIAL COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 63(b), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, HE IS 
PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF THE ISSUE.7 
Defendant's claim that the judge's comments during the sentencing hearing 
evidenced personal bias should not be reviewed under the general principle that 
issues raised for the first time on appeal cannot be considered. Wade v. Stangl. 
869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that general principle applies to 
allegations of judicial bias). The rules of civil procedure expressly give litigants 
a mechanism by which they can raise their concerns of bias to the judge and then, 
if necessary, seek judicial review. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b) (1995); Sukin v. Sukin. 
842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App. 1992) (appellate court will not consider allegations 
of judicial bias under appellant first complied with rule 63(b)). Defendant never 
filed an affidavit with the trial court. Therefore, this Court should refuse to 
entertain the issue on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions and sentences should be affirmed. 
knowingly and voluntarily (id.). 
7
 This point corresponds to point VI of defendant's brief. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
The State does not believe oral argument will assist the Court in deciding 
this case. Additionally, this case does not present novel or complicated issues 
that need to be published in order to assist courts and practitioners. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ffflday of December 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the J^^day of December 1995, two (2) copies of this BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE were sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
440 East 3300 South 




77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion 
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
